We introduced in this study a model of sovereign debt with an embedded Down-and-In Put (DIP) to capture the discontinuity in sovereign debt pricing. This study suggests that debt forgiveness is a more effective solution in debt crisis, as repayment bonus or award or capital market exclusion penalty invites moral hazard and push up yields. Although a debtor's current repayment capability reflects its current levels of repayment award, debt forgiveness or default threshold. While forgiveness works unconditionally, a debtor can only receive repayment award conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in unfavored consequences due to moral hazard. A creditor should therefore avoid offering repayment award to, or attempting to lower default threshold on, a debtor. Granting more forgiveness is, however, beneficial always. Overall, a strong GDP growth is still the most effective solution to lower long-run sovereign yields. Reexamining the argument of Krugman (1988) verifies that extra financing is indeed inferior to forgiveness. The forecasting errors in our model are only at fractions of those produced by other related studies, as our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of potential econometric problems. Our model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than existing works in literature, especially in the calibration of sovereign yields under various debt load levels, economic cycles, time to maturity and forecasting capability. Our model can be applied in the operation of risk management, as well as portfolio investments, for investors of sovereign debt instruments. Rosenthal, 1990; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) . The time-varying nature of these unobservable variables prompts us to adopt a state space model, such as Kalman filter, for estimation and updating. Revenue flow (e.g. Hayri, 2000) , foreign exchange reserves (e.g. Karmann and Maltritz, 2009) or GDP (e.g. Francois, Hubner and Sibille , 2011) have been used as the state variable in a model like this. We also choose GDP as the state variable in our Kalman filter model. The structural approach of Merton (1974) has long been applied on the valuation of sovereign debt. Karmann and Maltriz (2003,2009) employ directly the Black-Scholes put option formula. The model of Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) apply a reduced-form version of contingent claims model in the context of sovereign balance sheet with a distress barrier modeled as certain triggering levels of liabilities. Francois, et al. (2011) extend it to a structural approach framework to show how sovereign credit spread react to a nation's GDP and default threshold. Jeanneret (2013) builds his model also on a structural contingent claims approach, where a default boundary depends on tax revenue. In order to obtain reliable estimates of unobservable debt forgiveness and repayment bonus, we will also adopt a structural approach with an explicit barrier option formula.
I. Introduction
Sovereign default has been widely studied to explain what causes it, what costs it brings, how it can be avoided and what can be done to mitigate its consequences. Earlier works focus more on defaults by less developed countries (LDC) or smaller economies, and many argue that countries choose to default in their interests. Default probabilities are forecasted according to regressive findings between sovereign yields and observed default risks attributable usually unilaterally to sovereign debtors. However, events or factors arising in the debt negotiation process, which involve also choices of the creditors, have not been considered as often when forecasting future sovereign yields.
Recent sovereign debt crisis in the European Union indicates that the expectation of such factor as debt forgiveness affects significantly sovereign yields not only of the subject country, but also of other countries with similar risk profiles. To this extent, such factors are no less important than sovereign credit risks as forgiveness according Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) and repayment 'bonus' argued by Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) both have potentially wide-spread contagious influences over the international capital market. Prior to the case of Greece, previous sovereign defaults never involved a debtor with its home currency being a major international reserve currency. With this becoming more probable, the understanding of the potentially contagious factors mentioned above would be more important than ever for both international capital market and countries with outstanding, or plan to continue issuing, sovereign debt. In the past, empirical values of forgiveness and repayment 'bonus' were documented 1 after default events. However, estimating and forecasting these factors before actual default happens becomes crucial now, as the impact of sovereign default may no longer be isolated if it happens in, say, the Euro zone. Schwartz and Zurita (1992) show in a rational expectations model how forgiveness, as well as potential default penalty, is taken into account in the initial sovereign loan contract. As they argue that the penalty can be considered in the context of international regulation, it is similar in essence to the repayment bonus in Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) . Debt forgiveness and repayment bonus are in this context forward-looking and unobservable, or unknown at the time of loan pricing. They also need to be learned over time, from the perspective of sub-game equilibrium in a multi-stage renegotiation process (see Francois, Hubner, Sibille, 2011; Hayri, 2000; Fernandez and 4 interest of the creditor than offering repayment award. While forgiveness works unconditionally, a debtor can only receive repayment award conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in unfavored consequences due to moral hazard. We show in our sensitivity analysis that forgiveness makes sovereign debt more valuable, and the effect is more prominent as time to maturity shortens or repayment ability weakens. However, contrary to the prior belief of many, we find that debt value goes down with the magnitude of repayment bonus, as it actually raises the value of the DIP held by the sovereign debtor and lowers the value of debt perceived by the creditor. This seeming punishment to the creditor is especially stronger when the debtor performs better in the economy.
The default threshold, which activates the DIP, does not seem to affect debt value monotonously.
When the threshold is relatively high, a drop of it could lower the debt value due to more valuable DIP, which is more significant for longer maturities than shorter ones. Only when the threshold is relatively low, then its decrease helps to increase the value of the debt.
Our Monte Carlo simulations results suggest that sustained growth in national income or asset values is the most effective way to lower financing costs for sovereign debt. At given levels of forgiveness, repayment bonus and default threshold are expected to fall with time to maturity, a sovereign debtor with only moderate economic growth may not be enough to escape from rising debt yields over time. On a trajectory with relatively low income growth, increasing debt forgiveness or repayment bonus is the only way to possibly lower future debt yields. However, on a path with high income growth, the effect of slightly falling forgiveness and bonus would be overwhelmed by income and debt yields could potentially fall. Even with high income growth, a default threshold falling moderately would still lower the debt value in the early part of such trajectory, and start raising the debt value later on. We also reexamine the argument of Krugman (1988) , which suggests that extra financing to a heavily indebted country is distorting as compared to forgiveness. Simulations suggest that sovereign yields rise immediately following extra financing and would stay significantly higher than in the case of debt forgiveness. Extra financing literally pushes up the default threshold and hence the resulting yields. The knock-in feature of our model contributes much to the advantage of forgiveness over financing as debt value is highly sensitive to the 'distance to default'.
We adopt a Kalman filter algorithm to estimate the unobservable variables in our model, whose path-dependent nature also requires Bayesian updating. As our pricing model is highly nonlinear, we choose to apply an augmented unscented Kalman filter version according to Julier and Uhlmann (2004) . Estimation results suggest that higher sovereign yields imply higher 5 expected repayment bonus, forgiveness and default threshold. All three unobservable variables do fall with time to maturity. As a robustness check, we apply the same algorithm on yields simulated from our barrier option pricing model for various time to maturity and find results compatible with those from real market data. Additionally, the forecasting errors in our model are only at fractions of those produced by other related studies, as our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of potential econometric problems with other traditional methods.
Our model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than existing works in literature, especially in the calibration of sovereign yields under various debt load levels, economic cycles, time to maturity and forecasting capability. Empirical analysis can be carried out easily based on our model as bond price is present in a closed forms. The model can be applied in the operation of risk management, as well as portfolio investments, for investors of sovereign debt instruments. Sovereigns can also benefit from this model in managing national debt load and in optimizing maturity, size and floating time of new issues. A brief literature review and the model of risk threshold is given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III.
Conclusion is given in Section IV.
II. A Default Threshold Model for Sovereign Debt

Related Literature
Literature on sovereign debt focuses in general on global risks, credit risks and liquidity risks.
The main purpose of this study is on the credit risk component as the other two are either exogenous or determined by long-term factors. Recent evidence shows that the sharp increases of government bond yield spreads during the financial crisis were not caused by changes in macroeconomic factors, but more possibly by rising default risks. One reason for the extremely volatile sovereign spreads is that holders of sovereign debt often do not have recourse to a bankruptcy code at sovereign defaults, which in many cases are not determined by economic factors. The costs of sovereign defaults include reputation costs as argued in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) . François, Hübner, and Sibille (2011) discuss how sovereigns can negotiate with creditors exogenously while maintaining endogenous optimizing default decisions. Many sovereign defaults are prevented through negotiations or restructuring, therefore pricing issue is sensitive especially to risks induced by the extended long period of time. 6 Forgiveness, according to the seminal study of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) , is one remedy, on the basis of another key element, an enforceable default penalty. Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) take an approach stressing only possible awards to a sovereign debtor with game-theoretic models, where default penalty is not considered as a credible choice. The debtor receives, on full repayment, a 'bonus', in the form of improved access to subsequent financing, from international capital market rather than from the creditor. In their model, a creditor would pledge first on certain level of debt forgiveness, in place of default penalty, to encourage the debtor not choosing to default. In an equilibrium, the debtor chooses repayment willingly taking into account the magnitude of forgiveness as well as expected repayment bonus.
Following the early literature on debt reduction, many works of pricing formula are built on continuous time model with strategic default and debt reduction (see Cohen, 1993; Classens and van Wijnbergen, 1993; Hayri, 2000; Andrade, 2009 ). Further on, many works employ a reduced-form model with exogenously specified process of default intensity process, such as Merrick (2001) , Duffie, Pederson and Singleton (2003) and Pan and Singleton (2008) . They all assume that holders of sovereign debt face a single credit event of default, in the sense of Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1994) , and liquidation follows it.
Among those adopting a structural model, some employ a 'balance sheet' contingent claims approach (e.g., Gapen, Gray, Lim and Xiao, 2005; Gray, Merton and Bodie, 2007; Francois, Hubner and Sibille , 2011), which consider public, private and banking sectors in analyzing time and distance to a sovereign default. Gibson and Sundaresan (2001) , Westphalen (2002) , and Andrade (2009) also apply a contingent claims framework with strategic defaults. While default is modeled as a choice of the debtor, depending on domestic and international macroeconomic environment, it is not practical to assume the debtor's optimization scheme without allowing the investors to update their expectation as in models of Yue (2010) and Jeanneret (2013).
Sovereign debt limit is first formally introduced by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), where a country's debt capacity is limited by the extent to which creditor can impose default penalty. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) argue that issuing sovereigns possess legal or political advantages in deterring creditors' reclaiming moves, including payment rescheduling and renegotiation of payments. Hayri (2000) indicate with a continuous time framework that, whenever possible, creditors tend to choose larger and later debt reductions while debtors would choose smaller and earlier reductions. Guillard and Kempf (2012) discuss further about both default and no-default thresholds corresponding to the lower and upper critical values of debt levels. Beyond the default 7 threshold or the upper critical debt level, 'effective' debt load appears to be explosive. These models of debt threshold or limit, however, have few implications about how creditors can alter the effect of the threshold to improve their welfare.
Model
The economy we consider is open one with a representative sovereign borrower and investors with certain endowment and facing consumption-saving choices. Investors could either lend domestic or foreign currency to the sovereign borrower. The technology of currency exchange and the exchange rate are assumed to be given and do not change with amount or currency of borrowing. Both sovereigns and creditors can refer to an observable signal to achieve each party's decision, rather than relying on sets of expectations formed before the issuance of debt. They can expect to modify each other's decision over the life of the debt depending on changes in environment and that observable signal. It is natural to use debt price as the signal, and a satisfactory valuation scheme should be easy to understand and conveniently available. We would like to focus on factors influencing the expectations on the time or distance to a likely default. The process has to be, conforming to practice in the financial markets, irreversible such that given the information of this process debt price would start assuming an entirely different path. This is one feature different from many existing models, but it is much needed by issuing sovereigns and investors.
In our model, a Down-and-In Put (DIP) is considered, according to Merton (1973) Reiner and Rubinstein (1991) and Rich (1994) , in a framework where the issuing sovereign or the debtor purchases, conceptually, a DIP with exercise value at X from the investor or the creditor. In the literature of applying barrier option on corporate securities, a Down-and-In Call is often employed In order to conduct analysis in a setting where a debt issuer takes initiative, we chose a model with DIP where creditors as the writer of the put are just passive in terms of altering the value of a sovereign debt.
We assume D to be the amount the sovereign agrees to repay the investor T years from now 8 while X is the actual value that sovereign ends up repaying after an expected forgiveness is taken into account as below H, then the DIP starts taking the value of a standard put as formulated in Black and Sholes (1973) . The value of the debt would be the sum of discounted present value of X plus the value of a short put with parameters specified above. If V stays above H before maturity, then DIP maintain its value without changes, and the debt value would include in it a short DIP rather than a standard put. The value of the DIP follows, if H<X 4 ,
, where δ is current discount rate, r is the continuously compounded interest rate. K is, in the practice of option trading, the rebate offered by the writer if DIP is not knocked in before maturity, or in our context the expected repayment bonus from the creditor. Additionally, 3 Among others, Claessens and Wijnbergen (1993) use expected non-oil current account, and Karmann and Maltriz (2009) consider foreign exchange reserves to be the 'ability-to-pay' measure. It is also apparent that only a small percentage of the measure is relevant to actual repayment. 4 In the literature of corporate securities, H is usually assumed to be above X for simplicity, as in Brockman and Turtle (2003) , Giesecke (2004) and Lin and Sun (2009) , and it follows that
where T T
The first two terms in (2) denote the value of a long position on a standard put. For a sovereign debt this value amounts to, in the event of a sovereign default, how the borrowing country evaluates its option of surrender its national income or fiscal autonomy to the creditors' scrutiny in place of subsequent repayment. The following two terms are the value of the DIP before being knocked in, and the last term is the value of the repayment bonus promised by the creditor, which could also considered as a default penalty on the debtor. Although in (2) 
Although in our model the debtor receives an award for not defaulting prior to maturity, in the form of either a straight cash payment, lower borrowing rate in the future or a better credit rating, it could still be perceived relatively as a default penalty imposed on the defaulting sovereign debt issuers. The larger K is, the more the defaulting debtor would be penalized on the yield implied from (4), which would in turn raise the yield on its debt to be auctioned next time.
According to the binomial approximations of Baldi, Caramellino and Iovino (1999) and
Barone-Adesi, Fusari and Theal (2008), the approximated price of a barrier option should be positively related to an exit probability. The value of X in (2) affects the debtor's exit probability, which according to (4) would have a different implication for the creditor. If the borrowing amount D is the same as X and the debtor defaults, then higher X gives the debtor a more favorable exit and hence a higher DIP value. The creditor's claim by (4) is apparently lower given this defaulting situation. However if, before the debtor's income fall below the default threshold H, the creditor grants the debtor more forgiveness by lowering X, then it may be beneficial for both parties involved in this contract. The value of DIP could be higher due to a higher possibility of getting a repayment award, or lower due to the prospect of a less favorable exit at default 5 . In the latter case, the creditor's claim in (2) is higher, while the lower yield implied by that would benefit the debtor on subsequent borrowing.
Sensitive Analysis
【Figure 1】 Figure 1 plots, for the maturities of 1 year, 5, 10 and 20 years, sovereign yields according to (4) against values of expected repayment bonus at three given levels of GDP. Each of them can be considered respectively as representing a state with low risk (GDP=100), a state with medium risk (GDP=80) and a state with high risk (GDP=70). The variable k, expressed as a fraction of D, is the independent variable in this comparative statics analysis. Across the four sub-plots with different maturities, levels of expected forgiveness g, also expressed as a fraction of D, is parameterized such that it falls with time to maturity to fit reality. Similar treatment is done to default threshold h, which is expressed as a fraction of X. It is shown in Figure 1 , contrary to the expectations of many, that sovereign yield gets higher if a larger repayment award is offered to the debtor. An explicit or implicit commitment to a larger repayment award the debtor increases the debtor's incentive to default, as the expected vale of exercising the DIP becomes higher due to an increase of this award.
So the inclusion of the DIP in our model for sovereign debt leads us to question the effectiveness of a repayment award to the debtor in the sense of Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990).
Given different GDP levels, yields in the low risk state climb up faster than yields in the states with higher risks, and that gap widens as time to maturity shortens. For a maturity of 20 years in the low risk state, an increase of repayment award from an equivalent of 0.1% to 28.9% of D would raise the sovereign yields by 49 basis points, from 3.35% to 3.84%. In the high risk state, that difference is 14 basis points. If the maturity shortens to 10 years, the gap between two states goes up to 111 basis points, and further up to 287 basis points for an issue with 5-year maturity.
The difference reaches two thousand basis points for the maturity of 1 year. An imminent 28.9% repayment award could push the yield, in a low risk state, up to a level of 39.2%, 3,760 basis points higher than at the repayment award of 0.1%. While in a high risk state, that lift is only 1,755 basis points.
【Figure 2】 Figure 2 plots, for various maturities, sovereign yields according against values of expected forgiveness in three risk states as specified above. The variable g is the independent variable in this comparative statics analysis. Across the sub-plots with different maturities, levels of expected forgiveness g and h are also parameterized to fall with time to maturity. Here sovereign yields drops with increases in expected debt forgiveness. As in the comparative statics analysis of k, yields at a certain level of g are higher for the high risk state, with an exception in the 20-year maturity. In a high risk state, sovereign yields are actually lower than the other two states with lower risks, for low values of g. This is due to an assumed higher default threshold making the GDP level stay below h. DIP is exercised and takes on a higher value of standard put.
Here yields in the more risky states are also more sensitive to g, dropping faster as g increases, and more so as time to maturity shortens. As more forgiveness is expected by the market, a debt issue in the more risky state would benefit more. The exception appears when the time to maturity is only one year, where yields in the safest state increase, rather than decrease, in g. It happens because DIP is literally worthless and most of the value comes from the expected repayment award.
When the forgiveness is expected to be over 20%, even the yields in the more risky states start increasing in g. For the maturities of 20, 10 and 5 years, yields in the most risky state drops respectively 40%, 75% and 137% faster than in the safest state. The differences between yields in the most and the least risky state are, respectively, 59, 95 and 171 basis points.
【Figure 3】
Yields against expected default thresholds are plotted in Figure 3 , also separately in each of the three risk states. Levels of expected repayment award k and forgiveness g are still parameterized to fall with time to maturity. Sovereign yields decrease in expected default threshold at lower h values, and then start increasing in h. At relatively lower values of h, a higher threshold value makes DIP more valuable and the debt less valuable. As h gets beyond certain levels, a 12 higher threshold value makes DIP less valuable because the debtor gets more reluctant to surrender its national income. However, for shorter maturities such as 5-year and 1-year, yields are insensitive at very low values of default threshold. As the DIP is highly unlikely to be knocked in, its value is simply the sum of a standard put and the value of the expected repayment award. Over all, yields are lower for a default threshold at 100% of current GDP than at, say, 70% or 50%. This pattern is less pronounced as time to maturity shortens.
【Figure 4】
In Figure 4 , yields at given values of k are plotted against levels of GDP separately for each of the four maturities. In order to see more clearly how repayment award affects the responsiveness, both g and h are assumed to be fixed rather than falling with time to maturity. Although yields do fall as GDP increases, larger k makes yields less sensitive to GDP and also brings about higher yields at reasonable GDP levels, uniformly across all maturities. As GDP falls, the DIP becomes more likely to be knocked in, so a larger k committed to the debtor causes the value of the DIP to a bigger drop on the benefits expected from k, resulting in a higher debt value and lower implied yield.
In the case of 1-year maturity, yields become insensitive to increases in GDP, at higher GDP levels. This reflects the fact that exercising the DIP is practically unlikely and the only value left in the DIP is the expected value of the pre-committed repayment award, which is related only to the face value of debt rather than GDP values. For all other maturities, the likelihood of exercising the DIP remains, a higher GDP value makes the DIP less valuable. But the decrease in DIP is weaker because a larger repayment award adds more value to the DIP.
【Figure 5】 Figure 5 , plots yields at given values of g against GDP for various maturities. Both k and h are also assumed to be the same for all maturities. Higher g results in lower yields at given income levels and makes yields less sensitive to GDP for shorter maturities. As GDP rises, the difference in yields caused by g decreases, as the debtor's benefits on DIP falls due to a lower likelihood of default in the case of shorter maturities. Given indirect effect of g on yields, the direct effect is much stronger for shorter maturities because the same amount of forgiveness is worth much more.
When the maturity is at 20 years, raising forgiveness from 2.24% f original debt amount to 33.54% lowers yields by 82 basis points, at 80% of current GDP. The benefits for the 10-year, 5-year and 13 1-year debt are 145, 247 and 345 respectively. At 50% of current GDP, the differences would rise sharply to 108, 223, 479 and 3,455 basis points.
【Figure 6】 Figure 6 gives plots of yields against GDP at given values of h. Both g and k are assumed to be the same for all maturities. In general, higher default threshold does not benefit the debt in its value, a phenomenon contrary to the belief of many. The difference is caused by the existence of 
Simulations
The sensitive analysis above gives static relations among sovereign yields and repayment award, debt forgiveness and default threshold. In order to conduct a dynamic exploration, preliminary to our subsequent empirical analysis, on the variables of interest, we simulate projected paths for yields of a sovereign debt with 20 years to maturity over the next 60 months.
Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized to obtain simulated yields, which are also generated with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations falling with time to maturity. For the first month on the path, the standard deviation of the yield is set at 0.54%, and it is set at 0.51% for the 60 th month. Simulation is carried out one thousand times and the average is reported. For the three variables of interest, we conduct simulations twice, with one assuming a 6% growth of GDP and 1.5% growth for the other.
【Figure 7】 14 Trajectories of simulated yields with 6% GDP growth are plotted in Figure 7 for each of the three scenarios with different paths of k. The first is one where increases rapidly at an annual pace of 33% from its current level of 0.074, while in the second scenario k rises steadily at roughly 17% a year. The last one is when k goes up slowly at a pace of 5.6% annually. Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation being 25% of it. It is shown in Figure 7 (a) that the effect of rising k, which is supposed to drive up yields, is offset by income growth. When k is barely rising, the average simulated yields actually drop throughout the first 45 months before starting to go up slowly. It is the strong growth of GDP that overwhelms k over two-thirds of projected paths. Yields are able to maintain unchanged if k increases at the moderate pace, which is just enough to offset income growth. Even if k is expected to rise, for the purpose of exploration, in the first scenario at an incredible pace of 33% annually, yields could not start rising before the 25 th month due to the strong income growth.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As weaker income is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of rising k, all three scenarios exhibit rising yields. Yield in the first scenario ends up with a gain of 19%, about 10% short of its counterpart in 7(a) due to a 30% lower ending income level. But it goes all the way up there without going down first. The same results hold for the other two scenarios, where one gains 7.7% and the other is up by 2.8%, with neither going through apparent periods of falling yields.
【Figure 8】 Figure 8 gives the plots of three simulated scenarios, two with falling g, and one with increased debt amount to verify the conclusion of Krugman (1988) . The first is one where g rises slowly at 8.6% annually from its current level of 0.071, while in the second scenario g increases rapidly at an annual pace of 42%. In the last one, in addition to g falling at 42%, we let the debt amount go up by 5% whenever the default threshold happens to increase 20% over its value in the previous month. This scenario is set up to explore the extra financing alternative against simple forgiveness, as part of our verification of Krugman (1988) . Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation being 15% of it.
The top panel Figure 7 (a) contains plots on a 6% GDP growth. It is shown in that the effect of falling g, which is supposed to drive up yields, is offset by the strong income growth. When the forgiveness is expected to be go down over time in the first scenario, instead of rising, the average 15 simulated yield drops by 4% in the end. Even when the forgiveness expectation falls rapidly in the second scenario, average yields manage to increase just slightly by a mere 4%. In the last scenario,
we simulate under a scheme where 5% extra financing is granted whenever default threshold is 20%
higher the in the previous month. Without any change on forgiveness, rising debt amount would drive yields up by 5.6%, which is even worse for the debtor than forgiveness being withdrawn 42%
annually. This is another support for the Krugman (1988) argument that forgiveness works better than extra financing, for the creditor's consideration.
The bottom panel of Figure 8 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As weaker income is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of falling g, an 8.75% annual drop of g is able to drive up the yield by 6.6%, compared with a drop of 4% in 8(a) under strong income growth. If g goes down much faster at 42% annually then the yield would go up by 18%. When we apply the same analysis as in 8(a) on the Krugman argument, we find the ending yield to be just about the same as in the second scenario. The effect of extra financing is equivalent to withdrawing forgiveness significantly on the debtor, from 26% to 3% of debt amount, within a
five-year period.
【Figure 9】
To see how simulated yields are driven by changes of default threshold, we plot the results from three scenarios about h in Figure 9 . In the first one, h is assumed to rise slowly at 1.7%
annually from its current level of 0.71. In the second scenario h goes down moderately at 8.8% per
year, and more rapidly at 33% in the third one. The top panel is based on a 6% GDP growth, where rising h in the first scenario causes the yields to drop by 10%, verifying the predictions given by comparative statics in Figure 3 The bottom panel of Figure 9 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As weaker income growth is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of falling h, yields for all three scenarios increase over time. Along with the weak income growth, a slowly rising h at 1.2%
annually would result in a 2% higher ending yield. But if h goes down at an annual rate of 8.6%, the yield would rise to 6.9% higher than at the start, a difference of 37 basis points. Furthermore, if h should fall rapidly in the third scenario, then Figure 9 (a) shows that yields could go up by around 15% up to the 40 th month before dropping a little afterwards, when higher GDP makes DIP less valuable and pushes down yields.
The simulation results suggest that GDP growth plays a crucial role in the paths of future sovereign yields. A strong growth often overwhelms potential influences especially from either repayment award or default threshold. In the absence of potential positive contribution of income growth, sovereign yields tend to go up with k and h, but go down with g. Forgiveness seems to be the most effective approach to prevent deteriorating sovereign yields, while the effect of the other two depends on their own dynamics and also income growth.
III. Empirical Analysis
The Data
Our Summary statistics are reported in Table I .
【Table I】 Table I shows that, for the average yields of Mexico are the highest among all. On observed standard deviations, yields from Spain and Italy appear to be the most volatile during this period.
Apparently, compared with Italy, Spain has a problem of sharply declining GDP, which could be reflected by our simulation carried out earlier. While for Italy, short term volatility on its debt-to-GDP ratio rapidly pushes default threshold toward current income level and causes panicking pricing responses in 2011.
Unscented Kalman Filter estimation
The theoretical model introduced above in (2) and (3) Table II reports the results of an augmented UKF algorithm on the barrier-option model in (2) .
The scheme of creating sigma points according to Julier and Uhlmann (2004) has been modified to accommodate the non-negativity requirement of yields. The state dynamic function is a simple mean-reverting process, while the measurement process applies directly from (2) . The discount rate δ in (2) is assumed to be at 2%. The continuous interest rate is approximated by the short rate of each respective country. The volatility parameter is calculated with quarterly GDP of each country. GDP values are deflated first by figures for the year of 2002 and then scaled to 100. The face value of debt is the government debt to GDP ratio times 100. The theoretical values of the three unknown state variables are generated randomly, with priors filtered on simulated yields through similar UKF procedures whose results are presented in Table V , and are also assumed to be mean-reverting.
【Table II】
The augmented UKF procedure is executed for each country all the issues available in the data set for the years between 2003 and 2012. For instance, there are 208 issues from France, 90 from Italy and 47 from Spain, among others. Estimates for k, g and h are averaged over the 120 months in the estimation period and also over all the issues of a given country, and standard deviations and other statistics are calculated accordingly. The starting values of k, g, and h are therefore set at 0.05, 0.1 and 0.5 respectively.
It is shown that in general the yield data as we have collected appear to suggest that safer sovereign debt would produce lower estimates on the unobservable state variables of repayment award, forgiveness as well as default threshold. Germany appears to have the lowest average estimates, with k, g, and h at 0.0221, 0.0374 and 0.5641 respectively. Spain and Mexico appear to have the highest estimates, where on the implied repayment award of the former is about three and 18 half times that of Germany and around seven times for the latter. While the estimates for Mexico on the implied forgiveness is close to eight times that of Germany, the implied default threshold is, however, only around two and half times. Comparison of information in Table I and II indicates that the debt-to-GDP ratio is not an ideal indicator of sovereign risks. Italy has a ratio much higher than Spain, but their sovereign yields are quite close to each other. Our UKF estimates suggest that Spain have higher risks in all three aspects. Another similar comparison is between Netherlands and Israel. Although the latter has a higher debt ratio, its average sovereign yield is lower, in part due to shorter average maturity. The UKF estimates in Table II indicates that Netherlands appear to be less risky between the two. Table II are the population standard deviations of the three state variables, from P in (A.6). The averages of estimated state variable are in general five to 6 times larger for all countries, indicating their statistical significances. It is also shown in Table II that Kalman filter, is specified in the Appendix. For each country, we apply the IMM-UKF method, using the same parameters for Table II , on all the issues simultaneously.
Also reported in
The IMM-UKF filter produces, in each month for a given country, combined or probability-weighted estimates for state mean and covariance matrix. Table III 
IV. Robustness analysis and related discussions
Performance gains with UKF and IMM-UKF
To justify the use of UKF in this study, instead of a more commonly adopted Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) estimation method, we apply both on the same set of data and compare the differences in forecasting performances. 
Reliability of estimates using market data
The UKF procedures introduced in the previous section are carried out are primarily on debt issues all with different time to maturity, which creates a high level of noise in results. As the values of all three state variables should decrease in time to maturity, the averages reported in Table II and III are affected essentially by the average time to maturity of the country of interest.
Comparisons across countries may not reflect differences in sovereign risks. As a robustness check on the results reported in Table II and III, we have created separately simulated yield data using (4) for given time to maturity and carry out the UKF procedure for alternative estimates. In this stage of simulation, the discount rate is also assumed to be at 2%, and short rate is set at 1.5%, GDP growth volatility at 25% and debt to GDP ratio at 75%. For the simulation, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 are assumed as priors for k, g and h to start the filtering process with. They are further randomized and substituted into (4) to obtain raw yields. For each maturity, twenty thousand simulated yields are generated with a lognormal distribution having the raw yield of respective maturity as its mean. For the maturity of 20 years, simulated yields average at 5.48% with a standard error at 0.74%, compared with lower average yields from Italy and Spain and their much higher standard errors. The average simulated yields are 3.71%, 2.97% and 1.34% for the 10-year, 5-year and 1-year debt. The standard errors are 0.62% , 0.38% and 0.19% respectively.
【Table V】
In Table V , it is shown that the estimated repayment award for the maturity of 20 years is 0.08 and 0.085 under UKF and IMM-UKF respectively, which are higher than the estimates for Italy and Spain, but lower than those for Mexico, in Table II and III. Considering the average time to maturity of around 14 years for issues from the two countries, the estimates in Table V is comparably reasonable. Similar situations apply for the estimates of debt forgiveness and default threshold. With the overwhelmingly large data size, this exploration suggests that the actual values of the three unobservable variables should be within certain range of the levels given by Table II and III. The average maturity, the number of issues outstanding and the actual market conditions 21 all contribute to the variability of them.
【Table VI】
To verify the relevancy of the k, g and h in our analysis, we further regress the changes of 5-year sovereign CDS spreads on the changes in averaged estimates for k, g and h under UKF, and the combined estimates under IMM-UKF. The results are reported in Table VI , which suggest that, under both UKF and IMM-UKF, higher expected debt forgiveness for a given county pushes up CDS spreads. In the case of France, each additional percentage of expected debt forgiveness could make its 5-year CDS go up by 8 bps. While for Mexico, the effect goes down to only 4 bps, probably related to the fact that the expected debt forgiveness is already as high as 30%. Under IMM-UKF, both the expected repayment award and default threshold also influence CDS spreads in a significant way, only with smaller magnitudes.
Alternative Default Threshold
Our current model assumes the threshold to be below the exercise value of the debt. We have conducted related analysis on the case where the threshold is above the exercise value. The resulting knock-in effect becomes less apparent compared with the current model. The benefits of repayment award, forgiveness and default threshold are also less significant and become less conclusive in certain situations. The general outcome still holds in that forgiveness is the most effective in relieving the debtor's burden especially when default is more imminent. Also, forgiveness would still work as better alternative than financing.
V. C o n c l u s i o n
We introduced in this study a model of sovereign debt with an embedded DIP to capture the discontinuity of pricing response along observed debt-to-GDP ratios, and also to explain the behavior of yield volatility with the incorporation of repayment award, debt forgiveness and default threshold. We show that, in the context of debt negotiation, debt forgiveness is the most effective alternative in preventing sovereign yields from exploding over the course of debt crisis.
Repayment bonus or award in the sense of Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) or the capital market exclusion penalty as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) would not be preferred. The existence of DIP explains how that would invite moral hazard and push up yields, contrary to the creditor's initial intention. 22 Our comparative statics and simulated projections indicate that while forgiveness helps lowering sovereign yields, neither raising repayment nor lowering default threshold is constructive in keeping yields down. Our estimates obtained from an Unscented Kalman Filter suggest, however, that smaller repayment award, debt forgiveness or default threshold coexist with lower sovereign risks 7 . The repayment capability of a less risky country or debtor is reflected with the fact that market as a whole would assign low values of repayment award, debt forgiveness or default threshold. While forgiveness works unconditionally, a debtor can only receive repayment award conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in unfavored consequences due to moral hazard. As a forward-looking perspective, offering repayment award to, or attempting to lower default threshold on, a debtor would not be in the interest of a creditor. But granting more forgiveness is beneficial always.
Overall, our analysis shows that a strong growth in GDP is, beyond any negotiation strategies, the most effective solution to lower long-run sovereign yields. In the absence of that, we reexamine the argument of Krugman (1988) , which suggests that extra financing to a heavily indebted country is distorting as compared to forgiveness. We show in our analysis that extra financing literally pushes the default threshold toward the country's current income level and results in yields always higher than those under forgiveness. The knock-in feature of our model contributes much to the advantage of forgiveness over financing as debt value is highly sensitive to any income drop when default is imminent. To the debtor, forgiveness is better than extra financing granted from the creditors, regardless of the distance between current income and default threshold.
The forecasting errors in our model are only at fractions of those produced by other related studies, as our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of potential econometric problems with other traditional methods. Our model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than The predicted state mean and covariance matrix would then be computed as
where the sigma points of actual state variables and process noise are and respectively. In the update stage, except that retains the same functional form,we have instead , ,
.
(A.9)
The filter gain, update state mean and covariance matrix would retain the same functional from as (A.6).
The Interactive Multiple Model (IMM) filter
If we are to estimate a system with multiple models, which takes the form where is the probability of model in the time step k-1 and is a normalization factor.
Mixing the means and covariances each filter j is done by
where and are the updated mean and covariance for model i at time step k-1.
The filtering phase for UKF requires, for each model , filtering is carried out as Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of k. The first is one where increases rapidly at an annual pace of 33% from its current level of 0.074, while in the second scenario k rises steadily at roughly 17% a year. The last one is when k goes up slowly at a pace of 5.6% annually. Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation being 25% of it. Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized to obtain simulated yields, which are also generated with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations falling with time to maturity. For the first month on the path, the standard deviation of the yield is set at 0.54%, and it is set at 0.51% for the 60 th month.
Simulation is carried out one thousand times and the average is reported.
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Figure 8: Sixty-month simulations of yields in response to changes of debt forgiveness
Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of g. The first is one where g rises slowly at 8.6% annually from its current level of 0.071, while in the second scenario g increases rapidly at an annual pace of 42%. In the last one, in addition to g falling at 42%, we let the debt amount go up by 5% whenever the default threshold happens to increase 20% over its value in the previous month. This scenario is set up to explore the extra financing alternative against simple forgiveness, as part of our verification of Krugman (1988) . Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation being 15% of it. Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized further to obtain simulated yields with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations specified as for the simulations plotted in Figure 7 .
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Figure 9: Sixty-month simulations of yields in response to changes of default threshold
Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of h. In the first one, h is assumed to rise slowly at 1.7% annually from its current level of 0.71. In the second scenario h goes down moderately at 8.8% per year, and more rapidly at 33% in the third one. Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of h as mean and standard deviation being 30% of it. Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized further to obtain simulated yields with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations specified as for the simulations plotted in Figure 7 . (2) . The discount rate is assumed to be at 2%, short rate at 1.5%, GDP growth volatility at 25% and debt to GDP ratio at 75%. For the simulation, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 are assumed for k, g and h. They are further randomized and substituted into (4) to obtain raw yields. For each maturity, 20,000 simulated yields are generated with a lognormal distribution having the raw yield of respective maturity as its mean. For the maturity of 20 years, simulated yields average at 5.48% with a standard error at 0.74%. The average simulated yields are 3.71%, 2.97% and 1.34% for the 10-year, 5-year and 1-year debt. The standard errors are 0.62% , 0.38% and 0.19% respectively. 
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